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ON THE EXTENT OF THE DELIBERATIVE CONSTRUCTION IN RELATIVE CLAUSES IN GREEK.

BY WILLIAM W. GOODWIN.

A VIGOROUS discussion has been carried on of late concerning the nature of certain relative clauses with the subjunctive and optative in Attic Greek, which seem to lie in the borderland between indirect deliberative questions and final relative clauses. The question meets us full in the face, somewhat to our mortification, when we attempt to explain Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 7, οὐ τοῦτο δέδοικα μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ ἐκάστω τῶν φίλων, ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, and schoolboys beginning the *Anabasis* may smile when they find their masters at loggerheads so soon as this. Nearly all are agreed that ὃ τι δῶ is an indirect deliberative question. But what are we to do with ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ, where we have a relative with its antecedent? Can we explain ὃ τι δῶ and οἷς δῶ on different principles without violence to the sense; and can we explain them on the same principle without violence to the principle? As I have expressed myself on these constructions several times during the last thirty-five years, not always consistently and never with a full consideration of all the facts bearing on the case as I now understand them, I may be pardoned if I enter the discussion at this late hour, rather with the object of reviewing the results of the discussion than with the hope of establishing any new conclusions. One important result of the recent discussion has been the collection of a sufficient number of examples to show the full extent of the construction in question.¹

¹ To the paucity of examples we must ascribe the unsatisfactory treatment of this subject by Krüger and Madvig, and I trust I may hope for consideration on the same ground. I make no attempt here to discuss all the views which

It is well known that the Homeric language could express purpose by a relative clause with the subjunctive or optative (the subjunctive clause regularly having *κέ*); as *ἡγεμόν' ὅπασσον, ὃς κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη*, *Od.* xv. 310, and *ἄγγελον ἦκαν, ὃς ἀγγείλειε γυναϊκί*, *Od.* xv. 458. Homer has also the deliberative subjunctive in indirect questions; as *μάρνασθ', ὅπποτέροισι . . . ὀρέξῃ*, *Il.* v. 33 (with *κέ*, *Il.* xxii. 130), and the corresponding optative after past tenses, as *κλήρους πάλλον, ὀπότερος πρόσθεν ἀφείη ἔγχος*, *Il.* iii. 316. Both of these constructions appear in Latin. In Attic Greek the indirect deliberative question is retained in essentially the same form as in Homer; as in *ἀπορῶ ταύτην ὅπως ἐκδῶ*, *Dem.* xxvii. 66, and *ἠπόρει ὃ τι χρῆσαιτο τῷ πράγματι*, *Xen. Hellen.* vii. 4, 39. On the other hand, the final relative clause with the subjunctive and optative is replaced in Attic by an equivalent relative clause with the future indicative, which is regularly retained after past tenses. Thus we have in Attic *πρεσβεῖαν πέμπειν, ἣτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ*, *Dem.* i. 2, corresponding to Homeric *ἣ κε ταῦτ' εἴπῃ*, and *ναυτικὸν παρεσκεύαζον, ὃ τι πέμψουσιν ἐς τὴν Δέσβον*, *Thuc.* iii. 16, corresponding to Homeric *ὃ τι πέμψαιεν*. While now it is admitted that we could not have *ἣτις ταῦτ' εἴπῃ* (much less *ἣ ἀν ταῦτ' εἴπῃ*) in Attic for *ἣτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ* above, there is much dispute about the nature of such sentences as the following:—

ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *Isoc.* iv. 44.

οὐκ ἔχω σοφισμόν' ὅτῳ ἀπαλλαγῶ, *Aesch. Prom.* 470.

οὐδένα εἶχον, ὅστις ἐπιστολὰς πέμψειε, *Eur. I. T.* 588.

For reasons which will appear later, I shall discuss the subjunctive and the optative in these constructions separately.

have been presented in this discussion, still less to reply to all the arguments which are opposed to my own views. I refer, once for all, to the papers in the *Classical Review* by Mr. Arthur Sidgwick (April, 1891), by Professor Tarbell (July, 1891), by Dr. Mortimer L. Earle (March, 1892, and later), and to Professor W. G. Hale's satisfactory paper on "*Extended*" and "*Remote*" *Deliberatives in Greek*, in the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxiv. pp. 156–205, in which Professor Hale supports many of the views which I have several times expressed since 1865, by arguments which have given me much new light on the whole question.

I. SUBJUNCTIVE.

It is agreed on all hands that subjunctives of this class depending on ἀπορώ, βουλεύομαι, οὐκ οἶδα, and other expressions which naturally introduce indirect questions, are interrogative and deliberative; as in Dem. xxvii. 66 and Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 4, 39, quoted above. It is generally admitted, further, that the same deliberative interrogative may follow οὐκ ἔχω in the sense of ἀπορώ, as in οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω, *I have nothing to say*; where, however, the English translation is misleading, the literal meaning being *I have not* (i.e. *I am at a loss*) *what I shall say*. That ὃ τι is really interrogative here is plain from cases like οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, *I have nothing to say*, Dem. ix. 54; οὐκ ἔχω τί φῶ, Aesch. *Cho.* 91, and οὐκ ἔχω ἐπὶ τίνα μηλοθύταν πορευθῶ, Eur. *Alc.* 120; and this appears in the Latin *non habeo quid* (or *quod*) *dicam*. The first serious question arises when an affirmative ἔχω is followed by a similar subjunctive in a relative clause, as in ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, *to have something to glory in*, Isoc. iv. 44, where the uninstructed mind would see no trace of an indirect question, but rather an approach to a final force.¹ Other similar cases are ἐὰν μόνον ἔχη ὅτῳ διαλέγεται, Plat. *Symp.* 194 D, and ἔξειν ὃ τι εἰσφέρωσιν, Xen. *Oec.* vii. 20 : see also [Lys.] vi. 42 and Plat. *Phaedr.* 255 E, where λέγῃ for λέγει in both is Bekker's necessary emendation. My suspicion of the final character of these forms was first aroused by Krüger's remark (*Spr.* § 54, 7, A. 2), that the construction with the subjunctive is "nicht statthaft in der Regel, wenn ἔχω keine Negation bei sich hat oder der Satz nicht wenigstens eine Negation involvirt," after which he quotes εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, Plat. *Ion.* 536 B, in brackets with a (?). But in this most instructive passage we find καθεύδεις τε

¹ In the first edition (1860) of my *Greek Moods and Tenses*, § 65, 1, n. 3, my "uninstructed mind" took this for a survival of the Homeric subjunctive in final relative sentences; and in 1863 I gave the same explanation in a note on the passage in the revised edition of Felton's *Panegyricus*. But my misgivings compelled me to retract this error to a great extent in an Appendix to that edition (p. 135); and in the second edition of the *Moods and Tenses* (1865) and subsequently I have expressed at least a near approach to my present opinion. I am naturally sorry to see my old note of 1863 brought up in judgment against me at full length by Dr. Earle, especially as it meets his approval.

καὶ ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, followed by εὐθὺς ἐργήγορας . . . καὶ εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς. As nobody doubts that ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, *you know not what to say*, has a deliberative question of the most common form, can there be any doubt that the antithetical εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, *you have plenty to say*, is to be explained on the same principle, even though the deliberative question is here much obscured? And if εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς is deliberative and not final, can we avoid explaining ἔχεις ὃ τι λέγῃς in the same way? As the analogy of ἀπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς carried the deliberative form into εὐπορεῖς ὃ τι λέγῃς, so the analogy of οὐκ ἔχεις (= ἀπορεῖς) ὃ τι λέγῃς carried it into ἔχεις ὃ τι λέγῃς, in each case beyond the strict limits of the deliberative interrogative.

Another more serious step is taken when ἔχω has an object which is the antecedent of the relative introducing the dependent subjunctive, as in οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω. This shows that ὃ τι is a true relative, and that its force as an indirect interrogative, which was obscured in ἔχεις ὃ τι εἶπῃς, is now entirely lost. And yet the analogy which we have hitherto followed can carry us still further, so as to include this case. Here again we fortunately have a single sentence with two constructions which explain each other. In Xen. *Anab.* i. 7, 7, already quoted (page 1), we have μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ followed immediately by μὴ οὐκ ἔχω ἱκανοὺς οἷς δῶ. Although ὃ τι δῶ is an interrogative sentence and οἷς δῶ is a relative sentence, it seems obvious that the force of δῶ is the same in both. If we had οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι δῶ in the former clause, would the nature of δῶ as a subjunctive be changed? Likewise, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω, Soph. *Phil.* 938, cannot reasonably be separated from such a sentence as οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ λέγω, so far as the force of the subjunctive is concerned, though the latter would be interrogative while the former is relative.

We have thus come, through a simple process of evolution, to a form of expression in which a pure relative with an expressed antecedent introduces a subjunctive which derives all its modal force from the deliberative subjunctive, an interrogative form. We admit that the construction in this form may contain more or less final force; but this comes naturally from the intimate relation between the deliberative and the hortatory subjunctive, — ἔλθωμεν; *shall we go?* being the interrogative corresponding to ἔλθωμεν, *let us go*; and

μὴ ἔλθωμεν; *shall we not go?* corresponding to μὴ ἔλθωμεν, *let us not go*. I have always attempted to distinguish cases in which there is a true indirect question, like οὐκ οἶδ' ὃ τι εἶπω, from those in which the interrogative has become more or less a relative, by saying that the latter are formed "on the analogy" of the former, explaining, for example, ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω, *I have something to say*, by the analogy of οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι (or τί) εἶπω, *I have nothing to say*, and οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω as another step following the same analogy in a different direction. The great variety of examples which must be brought under the principle we are considering calls for some stronger term than "analogy." A new expression has been proposed by Mr. Arthur Sidgwick in the *Classical Review* for 1891, p. 148, where he calls the various steps of the development by which οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω is evolved from ἀπορῶ ὃ τι εἶπω "an extension of the deliberative construction." The process of "extension" is thus excellently described by Mr. Sidgwick:—

"The fact I believe to be that the deliberative construction is subtly modified, and three stages may be traced as follows:—first stage, truly interrogative and deliberative; second stage, where the interrogative character is sliding into the relative; third stage, where the relative character of ὅστις is established." For Mr. Sidgwick's examples, which are all of the optative, I should give the following:—first stage ἀπορῶ (οὐκ οἶδα or οὐκ ἔχω) ὃ τι εἶπω, second stage ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω, third stage οὐδὲν ἔχω ὃ τι εἶπω. From this term "extension," the name "extended deliberatives" has been given by Mr. Hale and others to the various classes of subjunctives (and the corresponding optatives) which spring from the deliberative question but are yet no longer interrogative.

We have still to notice briefly other examples of the "extended deliberative" which have been quoted in this discussion. The two cases in Xen. *Anab.* ii. 4, 19, οὐδὲ ἔχοιμεν ἂν ὅποι σωθῶμεν and οὐχ ἔξουσιν ὅποι φύγωσιν are simply interrogative and need no remarks. In Aesch. *Prom.* 470, οὐκ ἔχω σόφισμ' ὅτῃ πημονῆς ἀπαλλαγῶ, though "extension" has produced a relative sentence, the original deliberative subjunctive is still obvious. The sense is, *I have no plan* (i.e. *I know not how*) *to escape*, and we might have had οὐκ ἔχω (or οὐκ οἶδα) ὅτῃ σοφίσματι ἀπαλλαγῶ. But we may call ὅτῃ ἀπαλλαγῶ simply

an indirect question, depending on the preceding words, which have the sense of *I cannot see*. So in Isoc. xxi. 1, οὐ προφάσεως ἀπορῶ, δι' ἣντινα λέγω, the meaning is *I am at no loss for a reason why I shall speak*, and we have a simple indirect question, as Professor Tarbell has well explained it (*Classical Review* for 1891, p. 302). Again, in Eur. *Orest.* 722, κοῦκέτ' εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες, ὅποι τραπόμενος θάνατον φύγω, the obvious sense is *I am now hopeless* (as to the question) *whither I shall turn and escape death*. When ἐστὶ with a possessive dative is equivalent to ἔχω, the deliberative construction may follow, with the same "extension" as after ἔχω. We have Soph. *Aj.* 514, ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ἐστὶν εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω, which is equivalent (so far as the subjunctive is concerned) to οὐκ ἔχω εἰς ὃ τι βλέπω, and Eur. *H. F.* 1245, γέμω κακῶν δὴ, κοῦκέτ' ἔσθ' ὅπου τεθῇ, where ποῦ τεθῇ; is involved. We have also Andoc. iii. 16, εἰ μήτε δι' ὃ τι μήτε ὅτοιςι μήτε ἀφ' ὅτου πολεμήσωμεν ἔστι (sc. ἡμῶν), which might have been εἰ μήτε ἔχομεν κτλ. In most of the cases quoted in this paragraph the relation of the construction to the deliberative has been doubted. In a single case which remains, Ar. *Eg.* 1320, τίν' ἔχων φήμην ἀγαθὴν ἦκεις, ἐφ' ὅτῳ κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς; the construction has seemed more doubtful. It seems to me by far most natural to take the dependent clause as an indirect question, representing ἐπὶ τίνι (*for what* or *in whose honor*) κνισῶμεν ἀγνιάς; depending on the idea *what have you to report to us?* or *can you tell us?*

If these passages have been rightly interpreted, we see that all the examples of the subjunctive which have been quoted in recent discussions to show the final character of the construction in question are easily explained as "extended deliberatives"; and it would be difficult to draw a line between any two of these examples and call one deliberative and the other final. It is, moreover, never to be overlooked, that there is no instance of an Attic subjunctive in such an undoubted final relative clause as the Homeric ἡγεμόν' ὅπασσον, ὃ κέ με κείσ' ἀγάγη (see page 2).

II. OPTATIVE.

It remains to be considered how far the optative in this class of sentences follows the same principles and is subject to the same

restrictions as the subjunctive. In five of the passages quoted by Mr. Hale (*Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc.* xxiv. pp. 158-160) the optative can easily be explained by the extension of the deliberative construction which is assumed for the subjunctive. These are the following:—

οὐκ ἔχων βάσιν, οὐδέ τιν' ἐγχώρων κακογείτονα, παρ' ᾧ . . . ἀποκλαύσειεν, *Soph. Phil.* 692.

οὐδένα εἶχον ὅστις . . . τὰς ἐμὰς ἐπιστολὰς πέμψειε, *Eur. I. T.* 588.

πρότερον οὐκ ἔχων πρόφασιν ἐφ' ἧς τοῦ βίου λόγον δοίην, *Lys.* xxiv. 1.

οὐκ εἶχομεν ὅτον ἐπιλαβοίμεθα οὐδ' ὅτον κρατοῖμεν, *Dem.* xxxv. 25.

οὐδὲ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τις ἔην . . . ὄντιν' ἐροίμην, *Theoc.* xxv. 218.

In all these we could have corresponding forms with the subjunctive similar to those already discussed. To these we may add *Xen. Hellen.* i. 3, 21, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ὅ τι ποιήσαιεν, and i. 4, 15, οὐκ εἶχεν ὅπως ὠφελοίη, which need no comment.

We find a very different problem when we come to a case like *Soph. Trach.* 903, κρύψας' ἐαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι, where we cannot suppose a corresponding Attic construction with the subjunctive like κρύπτει ἐαυτὴν ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδῃ, for here we should certainly find ἔνθα μή τις εἰσώπεται. In *Soph. Aj.* 658 we actually have κρύψω τὸδ' ἔγχος . . . ἔνθα μή τις ὄψεται. The Attic form with the optative strictly corresponding to the latter would be ἔκρυψα ἔγχος ἔνθα μή τις ὄψοιτο, which we find in *Oed. Tyr.* 796, ἔφενγον ἔνθα μή ποτ' ὀψοίμην ὀνειδέη (so *Xen. Hell.* ii. 3, 11, and *Isaeus* ii. 10). But this future optative is a rare exception, the future indicative being the regular form even after past tenses. It is obvious that we have in ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι in *Trach.* 903 a form of expression which has no exact parallel after a present or future tense; and it is further plain that we are here beyond the utmost limits to which it was necessary to "extend" the deliberative construction in order to explain the cases of both subjunctive and optative which have hitherto been discussed. Shall we then suppose another extension of the deliberative construction to cover this new case, or shall we look on ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι as a survival of the Homeric optative in similar sentences which corresponded to the more common Homeric subjunctive (see page 2)? Fortunately we have in *Ar. Ran.* 96 and 98 two

relative clauses which illustrate this point most clearly. The verses are : —

AION. γόνιμον δὲ ποιητὴν ἂν οὐχ εὖροις ἔτι
ζητῶν ἂν, ὅστις ῥήμα γενναῖον λάκοι.

HP. πῶς γόνιμον;

AION. ὡδὲ γόνιμον, ὅστις φθέγγεται
τοιουτονί τι παρακεκινδυνευμένον.

Here ὅστις λάκοι clearly expresses purpose; there is no deliberative force apparent, and we cannot think of substituting ὅστις λάκη for it: it is therefore no case of assimilation. But in the next verse we have the true Attic form for such a relative clause in ὅστις φθέγγεται, which would regularly have been retained in the preceding verse or possibly changed to ὅστις φθέγγετο. The exceptional ὅστις λάκοι is like ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι in *Trach.* 903, and must be explained on the same principle. The repetition of ὅστις λάκοι by ὅστις φθέγγεται, when this suits the verse, indicates that both forms were felt to express purpose; and the comparison of εἰσίδοι in *Trach.* 903 with ὄψεται in *Aj.* 658 and ὀψοίμην in *Oed. Tyr.* 796 points in the same direction. Such optatives as those we are discussing are rare; and it is significant that we never find such a sentence in Attic as the Homeric ἄγγελον ἦκαν, ὃς ἀγγεῖλει γυναικί, as Mr. Sidgwick rightly remarks. It seems to me, on the whole, more natural to suppose that the process of extension, by which we naturally derive οὐδένα εἶχον ὅστις πέμψειε from ἡπόρουν ὅστις πέμψειε (based on τίς πέμψη;), went a step further in the optative than in the subjunctive and gave us a few such expressions as ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι and ὅστις λάκοι. Three circumstances may have facilitated this step in the optative which were wanting in the subjunctive. First, the optative in οὐδένα εἶχον ὅστις πέμψειε is much further removed from the original ancestor τίς πέμψη; than is the subjunctive in οὐδένα ἔχω ὅστις πέμψη, so that there would be less deliberative force remaining to prevent the optative from taking the further step out of all reach of the deliberative idea. Secondly, the Homeric final relative clause with the optative, which was familiar to all Athenians, did not differ in its form from the Attic clauses we are considering, while the Homeric clause with the subjunctive regularly had κέ: this would facilitate the Attic opta-

tive in its extension in the Homeric direction, and retard the Attic subjunctive. Thirdly, the Attic relative clause of purpose with the future indicative, which superseded the Homeric subjunctive with *κέ*, had no distinct optative form in common use after past tenses, the future optative being exceptional; so that there was really a much greater need of the present or aorist optative here than there was of the subjunctive.

To the examples of the optative must be added *Plat. Rep.* 398 B, αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηροτέρῳ καὶ ἀηδεστέρῳ ποιήτῃ χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελείας ἕνεκα, ὃς ἡμῖν τὴν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι κτλ., where ὃς μιμοῖτο καὶ λέγοι following ὠφελείας ἕνεκα is clearly final: if it were not final, it would be potential without ἂν. I have no hesitation in adding *Rep.* 578 E, εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἓνα . . . θείῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν, . . . ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν. Here, if we had ἔθηκεν εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, the parallel to κρύφασ' ἔνθα μή τις εἰσίδοι would be complete. After a present tense the relative clause would naturally take the form τίθημί σε εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου μηδεὶς βοηθήσει, not ὅπου μηδεὶς βοηθήσῃ (or ὅπου μέλλῃ βοηθήσειν): and after a leading optative we have μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, where we might have had βοηθήσοι. So in *Oed. Tyr.* 796, if ἔφενγον were εἰ φεύγοιμι, we might still have ἔνθα μήποτ' ὀψοίμην, in the sense *if I should fly to a place where I might never see*, etc., though μέλλοιμι ὀψεσθαι would be quite as natural. The optative in such relative clauses, so far as they are final, corresponds to no Attic construction with the subjunctive. But I believe that ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν contains also a distinct conditional force, and in this sense it corresponds to the regular subjunctive with ἂν. The mere supposition might have been made in this form: εἰάν τις ἄνδρα θῇ εἰς ἐρημίαν, ὅπου ἂν μηδεὶς μέλλῃ βοηθήσειν, i.e. *if we suppose one to place a man in a desert, where there shall be no one likely to help him*, if this had suited the general form of the sentence; only in this form the final force would disappear and the conditional form alone would remain. Indeed, the very words of Plato might be used to express a pure condition with no final force, if the idea were simply this, *supposing a man should be put into a desert and there should be nobody there likely to help him*. How would this differ from *Xen. Mem.* ii. 3, 12, εἰ βούλοιο τῶν φίλων τινὰ προτρέψασθαι, ὅποτε ἀποδημοίης, ἐπιμελείσθαι τῶν

σὼν, or *Cyr. i. 6, 3*, ὅστις μὴ, ὁπότε ἐν ἀπόροις εἴη, τότε κολακεῖοι, so far as the conditional force of the optative is concerned? But, in the sentence as it stands in Plato, ὅπου μηδεὶς μέλλοι βοηθήσειν not only expresses the purpose of putting the man into a desert, but is also a part of the condition supposed, being for this reason put into the optative rather than the future indicative, which would express only the finality.¹

¹ In my suggestion of the possible conditional nature of this sentence (*M. and T.* § 573) Dr. Earle sees "a good example of the mental bias" which has led me "to drag in a 'condition' at every turn," to the great detriment of my work. I hope I have justified myself, in this case at least, in the text. But I see that he "drags in" precisely the same condition which he deplores in my explanation, when he says that "the optative is merely an ordinary instance of attraction of mood." There is no possible case in which an indefinite relative clause like this can be attracted (or *assimilated*) into the optative by a leading conditional sentence (like *εἰ τις θέλῃ* here) unless it is itself conditional or final. As Dr. Earle rejects the final force here, he has only the conditional left. I think he will also fall into the same "bias of mind" which he sees in me, and will be grateful for it, if he will consider carefully Gildersleeve's wise and acute remarks in his review of Weber (*Amer. Jour. of Philol.* iv. pp. 421, 422) on the combined final and conditional force in *ὥς δὲν* (*κέ*) and *ὅπως δὲν* with the subjunctive, where the only rational explanation of the use of *δὲν* and *κέ* with relative final particles and of their total absence with the pure final *ὅνα* is suggested, and also Gildersleeve's formula, *ὅπως δὲν = ἥν πως*, which, rightly understood, is a powerful solvent of many difficulties.

I regret that I have not made myself clear to Professor Sonnenschein on the two-fold relation which (in common with most scholars) I admit in certain clauses with *ἕως*, *until*, etc., and the subjunctive. I have never called these "purpose clauses" simply; and I agree perfectly with Professor Sonnenschein that *μένω ἕως δὲν ἔλθῃ* and *ἔμενον ἕως ἔλθοι* are "not equivalent to 'I am (was) waiting *in order that* he may (might) come.'" (*Class. Rev.* 1894, p. 28.) What I did say was this: "A conditional clause may refer to an object which is aimed at in the action of the leading verb; as *Πάτροκλον ἔφεπε ἵππους, εἰ κέν μιν ἔλθῃ*, *turn your horses on Patroclus, if haply you may take him*, i.e. *that you may take him (if haply you may)*. In like manner a conditional relative clause with *until* is very apt to refer to an object aimed at, and thus to become at once final, relative, and conditional: thus in *Il. iii. 291* (*μαχήσομαι αὐθι μένων, εἰς κε τέλος πολέμοιο κιχέω*) it is distinctly implied that *the end of the war* is a condition which is to limit the time of fighting and also an object at which the fighting aims." (*M. and T.* § 612.) The final character involved in many of these clauses is unmistakable when a subjunctive is used instead of the optative after a past tense, by the principle of *oratio obliqua*.

The "mental bias" which will enable us to see the various combinations of

One passage remains to be considered, the discussion of which opened the whole question now before us. This is Soph. *Phil.* 279-282 :—

ὀρώντα (past) μὲν ναῦς, ἃς ἔχων ἐναυστόλουν,
πάσας βεβώσας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐδέν' ἔντοπον,
οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, οὐδ' ὅστις νόσου
κάμνοντι συλλάβοιτο.

In discussing Professor Jebb's treatment of ἀρκέσειεν and συλλάβοιτο here as indirect deliberatives—representing direct questions τίς ἀρκέσῃ; and τίς συλλάβηται;—Mr. Sidgwick proposes his term “extension” for such cases. Thirty-five years ago I called these optatives final, and classed them with ἔχειν ἐφ' οἷς φιλοτιμηθῶσιν, Isoc. iv. 44, as relics of the Homeric final relative construction; and I have still allowed this to stand, though I have since explained the subjunctive as deliberative. But after considering the cases of “extended” deliberative optatives which have been discussed, especially Soph. *Phil.* 692, I can now see no good reason for excluding these from the class. The decisive test, I conceive, must be the possibility of referring the optative to a similar subjunctive which would be allowed in Attic Greek. The difference between ὀρών οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ and ἔχων οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ is surely not generic; and in our passage it is perhaps more correct to understand ὄντα with ἔντοπον, corresponding to βεβώσας, and so come to οὐδεὶς ἔντοπός ἐστιν ὅστις ἀρκέσῃ (cf. Soph. *Aj.* 514). I think, however, that this represents the utmost tension to which the deliberative construction can fairly be subjected, and that the optatives in question are very far removed from εἰσίδοι and λάκοι in *Trach.* 903 and *Ran.* 97.

Closely related to the optatives we have considered is the optative in a consecutive relative clause, Dem. vi. 8: τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει οὐδέν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο οὐδὲ ποιήσειεν, ὅφ' οὐ πεισθέντες τινὰς Ἑλλήνων ἐκείνῳ προεῖσθε. This is parallel to κρύψας' ἐαυτὴν ἐνθα μὴ τις εἰσίδοι, in so far as there is no corresponding Attic construction with the subjunctive. The Attic uses the future indicative here, as in relative final clauses:

conditional, final, consecutive, and relative forces, often joined with *oratio obliqua*, in the same verbal form, is a most valuable acquisition for a student of Greek Syntax.

thus τοιαῦτα ζητήσεις λέγειν ἐξ ὧν μὴ χείρων εἶναι δόξεις (see Isoc. xi. 49) is merely more explicit in its form of statement than τοιαῦτα ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν would have been, as δόξεις is a more definite form than δοκεῖν. This future indicative occasionally appears (like that in final relative clauses) as a future optative after another optative, as in Plat. *Rep.* 416 C, τοιαύτην ἥτις μήτε . . . παύσοι, κακουργεῖν τε μὴ ἐπαροῦ. The aorist optative in Dem. vi. 8 seems to come from a tendency to use an optative after the preceding optative and an objection to using the future. In Plat. *Rep.* 360 B we have a potential optative in the same consecutive sense, which is perfectly natural. But this passage is very peculiar : οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο, ὡς δόξειεν, οὕτως ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἂν μείνειεν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειεν κτλ. The omission of ἂν with δόξειεν, which is clearly potential, is very strange, and is not satisfactorily accounted for by the ἂν on either side of it with another verb ; still less by my "law of assimilation," to which Campbell refers it in the new Oxford edition (II. p. 174), for this assimilation is confined to conditional relative clauses and it would have presupposed ὡς ἂν δόξῃ as a possible alternative. Dr. Henry Jackson, in the Cambridge *Journal of Philology* (iv. p. 147), thinks that ἂν has been accidentally transferred from δόξειεν to μείνειεν, with which it is not needed, and he would make μείνειεν (without ἂν) parallel to προεῖσθε in Dem. vi. 8. We should thus have ὃς μείνειεν = ὥστε μείναι, as ὑφ' οὗ πεισθέντες προεῖσθε = ὥστε ὑμᾶς πεισθέντας προεῖσθαι.

It is sometimes hard to distinguish relative consecutive from relative final clauses, as the consecutive and the final force may be combined even in a clause with ὥστε : thus, in Plat. *Gorg.* 479 C, πᾶν ποιοῦσιν, ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι includes with its consecutive force the final notion which (by itself) ἵνα μὴ διδῶσι would express more explicitly. This is another case of the union of different conceptions under one verbal construction, which is a striking characteristic of the Greek language. (See foot-note on p. 10.)